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NOTE
PERJURED TESTIMONY AS A GROUND FOR
CORAM NOBIS IN KENTUCKY
In Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky 810, 168 S.W (2d) 48 (1943),
perjured testimony was made a ground for the writ of error coram
nobts in Kentucky Defendant, Anderson, was convicted of murder
in the course of armed robbery and was sentenced to be executed.
Shortly.before his execution, he applied for the writ of coram nobis
in the Fayette Circuit Court, and upon its being denied there, applied
to the Court of Appeals for issuance of the writ, on the ground that
the testimony of his confederate in crime was perjured and that his
conviction resulted from this false testimony The appellant filed
sworn statements made by the alleged perjurer, wherein the latter
repudiated his testimony given at the trial, insofar as it applied to
appellant, and declared that appellant was in no way connected with
the crime; that his actual partner was a man who had since died.
Held, the writ would lie. By this decision the court reversed Jones v.
Commonwealth' and Robertson v. Commonwealth," both of which held
that the writ would not lie on the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence generally or perjured testimony as a particular form thereof.
The instant decision represents an extension of the grounds of availa-
bility of the writ which is contra to the prevailing rule.
Coram nobis is an ancient common law writ used more fre-
quently in early days in civil cases but recently more often employed
in criminal proceedings. It is generally held to be available in all
jurisdictions where the common law is applicable, unless it has been
expressly forbidden by statute or is forbidden by implication because
there is a statutory equivalent.' Its function is to bring to the atten-
tion of the "thal court an error of fact, which does not appear on
the record, and which, being unknown to the court at the tfial and
beyond. the reach of the defendant by the exercise of due diligence,
was an essential factor in the-judgment reached.' It lies in an appel-
late court after affirmance of the original judgment as well as in the
trial court, though application for the writ should first be made to
the trial court, and, if possible, to the trial judge. -It has been held
to be an available remedy where the accused pleaded guilty of murder
on the advice of counsel, such plea being induced by the threat
'269 Ky 779, 108 S.W (2d) 816 (1937) See Note (1942) 31
Ky L. J. 86.
279 Ky 762, 132 S.W (2d) 69 (1939)
'Freedman, The Writ of Error Coram Nobts (1929) 3 Temp. L.Q.
365, 372.
'31 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 802; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec.
1606.
'Buckler v State, 173 Miss. 350, 161 So. 683 (1935)
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of mob violence; ' likewise, where the defendant was insane at the
time of trial;' where the defendant, who was a minor, at the time of
the trial appeared by attorney rather than by guardian;' where the
accused was a slave;8 also, where a clerical error was made in the
record' A majority of the cases expressly hold that the writ does
not lie for newly discovered evidenceu or perjured testimony I
The writ has been held to be a part of Kentucky law and to
be available wherever it would have been available at common
law, unless supplanted by a statute.' It has been held to be avail-
able in a proper case though the conviction has been affirmed by
the appellate court 1
In reaching its decision in the instant case, the court appears
to have been much impressed by the fact that after denying coram
nobts in Jones v. Commonwealth,' the defendant appealed to the
federal courts and won his release on a writ of habeas corpus," it
appearing in that case that the Commonwealth's attorney enter-
tained grave doubts as to the guilt of the accused and the justice
of the verdict. The accused was not brought to trial again. Under
the state of the law it appeared that after affirmance of his con-
viction and expiration of the time for the granting of a new trial,
a defendant could obtain no relief in the courts and could only
rely upon the mercy of the executive, though it clearly could be
demonstrated that the conviction was unjust. The court calls such
a situation abhorrent, apparently feeling that in such a situation
the defendant should be afforded relief in the same courts wherein
occurred the original miscarriage of justice instead of being com-
pelled to resort to federal courts.
The reason given generally for refusing to allow the writ on
the ground of newly discovered evidence or perjured testimony is
that to hold otherwise would render judgments too insecure to com-
port with sound public policy" In most jurisdictions the writ has no
time limitation8 and hence, it is said, many years after conviction,
the party could fabricate evidence, contending that it was unavailable
Sanders v State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882)
People v Smith, 296 Ill. 636, 15 N.E. (2d) 604 (1938), Swan
v. State, 215 Ind. 259, 18 N.E. (2d) 921 (1939)
8 Meredith v. Sanders, 5 Ky. 101 (1810)
8Ex parte Toney, 11 Mo. 661 (1849)
1031 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 802.
24 C.J.S., Crinmal Law, sec. 1606 at p. 149 and the many cases
there cited.
'People v Mooney, 178 Cal. 525, 174 Pac. 325 (1918) Jones v
State, 130 Fla. 645, 178 So. 404 (1938) People v Drysch, 311 Ill.
342, 143 N.E. 100 (1924)
'Jones v Com., 269 Ky 779, 108 S.W (2d) 816 (1937)
"Smith v. Buchanan, 291 Ky 44, 163 S.W (2d) 5 (1942)
"Supra, note 1.
1097 F (2d) 335 (1937)
"Bigham v Brewer, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 432 (1856)
"31 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 808.
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at the time of the trial, and upon that ground secure a new trial.
The prosecuting witnesses might be scattered and unavailable at that
time, the result being that the party, though guilty might go free.
No case could be considered as finally closed if the writ were to
be allowed on these grounds, contend the proponents of the ma-
jority rule. The court is fully competent to protect itself from im-
position. The fact that the writ was applied for many years after
the conviction, or that the evidence or perjury relied on was un-
covered as the shadow of the executioner approached would be cir-
cumstances which the court would weigh very carefully before
allowing the writ.
In the instant case the Court took the view that the appellant's
petition presented a state of facts, which, if true, disclosed the pos-
sibility of a grave miscarriage of justice, and that no other remedy
being available in the state courts, the writ of corain nobis should
lie as an emergency measure to prevent the execution of a possibly
innocent man.
While conceding the necessity of making judgments of convic-
tion for crime stable and final, yet this decision of the Court appeals
strongly to reason and justice. Appellant was convicted on the strength
of his confederate's testimony; without that testimony a conviction
would have been, at least, uncertain. It is true that the allegedly
false testimony stood for many months uncontradicted; nevertheless,
the court had before it a sworn statement to the effect that the testi-
mony which resulted in a death sentence for the appellant was
perjured, and that the man upon whom a death sentence had been
pronounced was innocent. It is difficult to perceive why these cir-
cumstances furnish grounds less valid for the issuance of the writ
than those instances, previously enumerated, where it was allowed.
Though most authorities subscribe to the contrary view, the
present decision is not without support. The Indiana Supreme Court
has said, " If, however, the newly discovered evidence be of
such a conclusive nature as to demonstrate it to be practically im-
possible, under all circumstances that the judgment was right upon
the merits, then the writ of error coramr nobzs will lie."'" It is said,
"The writ does not ordinarily lie for alleged false testimony at
the trial; but it has been said that the court has discretion to grant
the writ where it appears that the verdict most probably would
not have been rendered except for such testimony, and that there
is a strong probability of a miscarriage of justice unless the writ
is granted."' In Davis v StateP where the defendant was convicted
on perjured testimony that was procured by the prosecuting official,
the writ was allowed by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
"George v. State, 211 Ind. 429, 6 N.E. (2d) 336 (1937)
-24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 1606. See Davis v State, 200 Ind.
88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928)
' 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928)
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Despite the weight of contra authority it is submitted that the
view expressed in the instant case is more consonant with reason
and justice than the majority rule. Where the chief prosecuting wit-
ness repudiates his former testimony and absolves his alleged con-
federate in crime and names another as the party actually guilty,
sufficient doubt is cast upon the correctness of the judgment to justify
a re-examination of the evidence against the convicted party and
a weighing of the repudiation. This limited extension of the grounds
of availability of corarn nobts should seem to be a useful device for
enabling the courts to forestall gross miscarriages of justice in ad-
mittedly rare instances without impairing that desirable stability
of judgments which comports with sound public policy
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